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MISSOURI SECTION
NOTES
WIRE TAPPING IN MISSOURI
WiE TAPPING IN GENERAL
The law of wire tapping involves basically two problems: Is
wire tapping legal? If not, is evidence obtained through the use
of wire tapping admissible in court? The answers to these ques-
tions are interrelated to such an extent that it would be impracti-
cal to consider them separately. Furthermore, both together
raise the important issue: Should wire tapping be legal?
The problem of wire tapping first arose in 1928 in Omstead v.
United States.' The United States Supreme Court there held that
the interception of a telephonic communication by wire tapping
was not an unreasonable search and seizure within the prohibi-
tion of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. It had pre-
viously been held that evidence obtained by a federal officer in
violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in a federal
criminal case.2 Since wire tapping was not an unreasonable
search and seizure, evidence thereby obtained was admissible in
a federal criminal trial.3 The Court in the Olmstead case further
held that the admission into evidence of wire taps of a criminal
defendant's telephone conversations did not violate his right
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution; nor did the fact that the wire tapping was a
misdemeanor by state statute and, thus, illegally conducted, pro-
hibit the introduction in evidence of the information so obtained.4
In 1934, however, Congress enacted the Federal Communications
Act, Section 605 of which provides in part: ".... no person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any per-
son .... ,,5 A criminal sanction is elsewhere provided for violation
1. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4. The federal courts have generally followed the common law rule that
illegally obtained evidence is admissible, except where such evidence is ob-
tained in violation of a constitutional provision or where such evidence is
expressly excluded by statute. Ibid.
5. 605 is the section number of title 47 of the United States Code under
which this provision appears. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946).
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of this section.6 In 1937 the Supreme Court held that "no person"
under the above provision included the federal government, that
"divulgence" included divulgence in court, and that evidence
obtained by wire tapping was therefore inadmissible in a federal
court.1 In 1939 the rule was extended to exclude from evidence in
the federal courts any information obtained by the prosecution
through the use of wire tapping leads." In 1939 also, Section 605
was construed to prohibit the interception and divulgence of in-
trastate, as well as interstate, communications and to exclude
from evidence any information obtained therefrom.9 In 1951 in
Coplon v. United States,10 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia suggested a further restriction on wire tapping in hold-
ing that interception of telephone calls between a defendant and
his attorney during the period of trial violates the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment by denying to defendant the effec-
tive aid of counsel.
The Supreme Court, however, restricted somewhat the applica-
bility of Section 605 by two 1942 decisions. In Goldstein v. United
States" the Court held that a criminal defendant could not com-
plain of the testimony of witnesses who were induced to testify
by the use of wire tapping information where the defendant was
not a party to the intercepted calls. The right to assert the statute
as a bar to evidence rested solely in him whose communications
had been intercepted. 12 Goldman v. United States 3 held Section
605 inapplicable where a telephone conversation was overheard
by means of a detectaphone applied to a wall adjoining defend-
ant's office. 14 Finally in Schwartz v. Texas'5 the Supreme Court
6. 48 STAT. 1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1946).
7. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
8. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The basis behind this
decision was that, if information obtained by wire tapping could be used
for no purpose, wire tapping would cease.
9. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). Since wire tapping does
not distinguish interstate from intrastate calls, but rather intercepts all the
calls on one line, it was held that regulation of intrastate calls was necces-
sarily incidental to effective regulation of interstate calls.
10. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
11. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
12. This result seems inconsistent with the reasoning of the Court in the
second Nardone case. See note 8 supra.
13. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
14. The rationale of this decision was that Section 605 protected the
means of communication (telephone) rather than the substance of any com-
munication intended for telephone transmission.
15. 344 U.S. 199 (1952). This decision has ben provocative of state
legislative action. See the emergency clause, Section 5, of Senate Bill No.
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recently held that Section 605 did not prohibit the admission in
evidence in state courts of material obtained by wire tapping, but
was rather a mere factor to be considered by states in establishing
rules of evidence.
Thus, wire tapping is generally not violative of any provision
of the United States Constitution,16 but federal statutory and de-
cisional law make "interception" and "divulgence" of telephonic
communications without consent a crime." Federal law further
forbids the use of information obtained by wire tapping as evi-
dence in the federal courts, 8 but leaves to the states the power
to determine their own rules of evidence.19
What then are the restrictions on state action in relation to
wire tapping? First, there is no restriction imposed by the Fed-
eral Constitution. Should the Supreme Court one day declare
that wire tapping is violative of the Fourth Amendment, as sev-
eral justices have advocated,2 0 this limitation would probably be
imposed on the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the reasoning of Wolf v. Colorado.1
Mr. Justice Frankfurter there declared: "The security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the
core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause. ' ' 22
The Court further held, however, that evidence obtained by un-
reasonable search and seizure, though inadmissible in a federal
court, was admissible in a state court.23 Therefore, even if wire
198, which was proposed to the 67th General Assembly of Missouri on Febru-
ary 11, 1953.
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
17. 48 STAT. 1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1946) and 48 STAT. 1103(1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946).18. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). It should be noted
that there is some current activity in Washington on the subject of wire
tapping legislation. Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, May 21, 1953, p. 14D, col. 3.
The action in Washington, however, has not reached a stage worthy of
comment.
19. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). For a good discussion on
the development of the federal law, see Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire
Tapping, 32 CORNELL L. Q. 514 (1947).
20. See for example Brandeis' dissent in Ohnstead v. United States. 277
U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
21. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
22. Id. at 27.
23. The court's reasoning was that the right to be free from unreason-
able search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the exclusionary evidence rule applied in federal courts is
not a necessary incident of the fundamental right.
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tapping is held to be an unreasonable search and seizure, the
adoption or rejection of an exclusionary rule of evidence so ob-
tained will be left to the states.
The only other federal limitation on state action, Section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act, has already been considered. It
should be noted, however, that the criminal sanction thereby
imposed is, as a practical matter, illusory, there having been only
one reported conviction since 1934.24
State wire tapping may be restricted or prohibited by state
constitutional or statutory provisions. Since state courts are not
bound to interpret state constitutional provisions in the same way
the United States Supreme Court interprets similar federal con-
stitutional provisions, wire tapping may be considered an unrea-
sonable search and seizure within the appropriate clause of a
state constitution.25 The problem has generally not been raised
in the state courts. Even if the states considered wire tapping an
unreasonable search and seizure, most states would still admit
evidence so obtained in the courts. 26 Missouri, in the minority,
does not admit into evidence in the courts information obtained
by unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Missouri
Constitution.27 At least one state has an express constitutional
provision specifically prohibiting unreasonable interception of
telephonic communications but allowing limited wire tapping
pursuant to warrants similar to search warrants issued by the
court.2 1
State statutes regulating wire tapping vary considerably, and
since their content and effect have been thoroughly considered
by other writers,29 they will not be discussed further here.
24. United States v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941).
25. State courts would be more likely to follow the lead of the United
States Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
See Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A.2d 706, cert. denied sub nom. Neal v.
Maryland, 316 U.S. 680 (1942).
26. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), there appear complete
tables of states which adopt the rule that evidence obtained by an unreason-
able search and seizure is admissible. Id. at 33.
27. State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S.W.2d 794 (1942). This deci-
sion was based on Mo. CONsT. Art. II, § 11 (1875), which is the same as
Mo. CONST. Art I, § 15 (1945).
28. N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 12 (1938).
29. E.g. Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORNELL L. Q. 73
41947).
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THE MISSOURI SITUATION
The law concerning wire tapping in Missouri has been highly
speculative. The constitution and statutes of Missouri prior to
1953 did not deal directly with wire tapping, and prolonged re-
search has failed to reveal a single Missouri decision on the sub-
ject. Section fifteen of the Missouri Bill of Rights3 protects the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures of their "persons,
papers, homes and effects." The Missouri court could have con-
strued this provision broadly to include wire tapping. Had the
court done this, official wire tapping would have been absolutely
prohibited, and any information thereby obtained would have
been inadmissible in court.31 Proposed Missouri legislation would
accomplish the same result ;32 therefore, the question would not
arise in the Missouri courts if the proposed legislation becomes
law.
No Missouri statute prior to June, 1953, expressly prohibited
or allowed wire tapping. Section 560.310 of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri prohibits physical injury to telephone wires and
equipment. This section has not been construed by the Missouri
courts in relation to wire tapping, but the Washington Supreme
Court construed a similar statute to be inapplicable to wire tap-
ping, which .was not destructive of telephone equipment.3 In
light of the technological development of wire tapping equip-
ment,34 whereby no physical contact need be made with the tele-
phone wires, it is difficult to see how the above statute could have
any bearing on the law of wire tapping.
Section 392.170 of the Revised Statute of Missouri makes tele-
phone companies liable civilly for disclosure of telephone mes-
sages by the companies' employees. This section has little appli-
cation to wire tapping since tapping generally occurs far from
the telephone company and without the knowledge of any com-
pany employees.
30. Mo. CONST. Art. I, § 15 (1945).
31. State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S.W.2d 794 (1942) holds that
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in
court.
32. Mo. Senate Bill No. 393, 67th Gen. Assembly (1953) as amended by
House Committee Amendment No. 1.
39. State v. Nordskog, 76 Wash. 472, 136 Pac. 694 (1913).34. See Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legis-
lative Problem, 52 Co. L. Rnv. 165, 197 (1952), for a discussion of wire.
tapping methods.
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It has been generally acknowledged that some type of legisla-
tion should be enacted to clarify the law.3 5 On February 11, 1953,
a bill on wire tapping was introduced to the Missouri Senate pur-
suant to a proposal by the Senate Criminal Law Revision Com-
mittee.- A substitute bill was later submitted and passed by the
legislature with minor amendment.3 7 This bill is now on the
governor's desk. The original bill38 provided for the issuance of
ex parte orders by courts for wire tapping, such orders to be
issued on the oath of the attorney general, a prosecuting or cir-
cuit attorney, a sheriff, or certain police officers in cities of over
seventy-five thousand population. The oath was to contain an
identification of the line to be tapped, a description of the person
whose line was to be tapped, a statement of reasonable ground for
belief that evidence of crime could be thus obtained, and a state-
ment of the purpose for the tap. The order was to be effective for
no longer than six months unless extended by the court. The
bill further made the interception of a telephonic communication
by any person without authority under the act a felony.
The bill now on the Governor's desk,3 which is substantially the
original substitute Senate bill, provides that "[n] o person shall
intercept or .direct the interception of any telegraphic or tele-
phonic communication, nor shall any person divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of
any intercepted telegraphic or telephonic communication. .. ."
Violation of this act is made a felony, and evidence obtained in
violation thereof is expressly excluded from admission as evi-
dence "in any cause whatsoever."
The original bill and the final bill present graphically the un-
derlying question: Should limited wire tapping, closely con-
35. See the report of the Committee on Criminal Courts, Law and Pro-
cedure of the St. Louis Bar Association dated January 21, 1953, on file in
the Washington Unilersity Law Library.
36. Mo. Senate Jour., 67th Gen. Assembly (Feb. 11, 1953), p. 219.
37. Mo. Senate Bill No. 393, 67th Gen. Assembly (1953) as amended by
House Committee Amendment No. 1. The original Senate Substitute Bill
No. 198 provided for an absolute prohibition of wire tapping with no excep-
tions. Bill No. 393, as sent to the House, exempted telephone and telegraph
company employees from this prohibition. The final bill as passed was
clarified so as to limit this exemption of these employees to when they are
"acting in the regular course of conducting the communication business of
such companies."
38. Mo. Senate Bill No. 198, 67th Gen. Assembly (Feb. 11, 1953).
39. Mo. Senate Bill No. 393, 67th Gen. Assembly (1953) as amended by
House Committee Amendment No. 1.
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trolled, be allowed, or should wire tapping be absolutely prohib-
ited? To reach a sound conclusion to this problem, it is necessary
to consider both the policies involved and the practical applica-
bility of both the original bill and the bill as passed.
The basic conflicting policies are one favoring detection of
crime and another favoring the protection of the individual liber-
ties, including a right of privacy. The arguments of the sup-
porters of a limited system of government wire tapping center
around the importance of the detection and elimination of the
criminal element of society.40 It has been suggested that methods
equally distasteful, such as eavesdropping, spying, and the use of
informers, are used daily by the police in crime detection. Crim-
inals are bound by no set of ethical standards, and those fighting
crime cannot operate effectually when put at a disadvantage by
the imposition of undue ethical restraints. Since police cannot
operate well with hands bound, the elimination of wire tapping
might induce them to resort to methods of obtaining evidence
which are even more repulsive to the proponent of individual
liberties, such as the "third degree." It is further argued on
policy grounds that the decent citizen is not affected by limited
wire tapping; his privacy is not disturbed.
The proponents of an absolute prohibition of wire tapping em-
phasize the right of privacy and security and point out the pos-
sible abuses of legalized wire tapping.41 Interception of calls is
similar to a police-state action. It is a shotgun method of detec-
tion seeking evidence in general and continuing over an extended
period of time. It is unlike a legal search by warrant which seeks
a specific thing and occurs at one time with the knowledge of the
one against whom the warrant is issued. A search by warrant
40. Thomas E. Dewey in an oft-quoted remark said wire tapping is ...
one of the best methods available for uprooting certain types of crimes .... "
1 REV. RECORD N.Y. CONST. CON. 372 (1938). Wigmore presents strong
arguments in favor of limited wire tapping. 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 b
(3d ed. 1940).
41. The majority report of the Committee on Criminal Courts. Law and
Procedure of the St. Louis Bar Association dated January 21, 1953, on file
in the Washington University Law Library presents a concise summary
of the arguments against legalized wire tapping. Numerous magazine
articles have complained forcefully about the use of wire tapping. See
Ickes, A Dirtier "Dirty Business", New Republic, Jan. 9, 1950, p. 17; Fly,
The Wire-Tapping Outrage, New Republic, Feb. 6, 1950, p. 14, for typical
arguments supporting an absolute prohibition of wire tapping. The Mis-
souri Bar Association also endorsed an absolute prohibition of wire tapping,
9 J. Mo. BAR 64 (1953).
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does not infringe upon the privacy of the individual for more
than a short time. It is also to be noted that wire tapping in-
fringes not only upon the privacy of the one against whom a war-
rant issues but also upon the privacy of the second party to the
call. Wire tapping, by its nature a general dragnet procedure, is
a potential violator of all the privileged and confidential rela-
tionships such as the attorney-client relationship. It is further
argued that wire tapping is unnecessary to effective police action,
that it is in fact detrimental to the police in that the adoption of
unethical procedures lowers the general respect of the people for
the law.42 It should also be remembered that, in spite of failure
in enforcement, federal law still makes wire tapping a federal
crime.4
Aside from the policy factors to be considered, there is the
equally important consideration of practicality. The federal law
prohibits wire tapping absolutely and evidence so obtained is in-
admissible in court.44 This in substance is what the pending Mis-
souri statute provides. What has been the effect of the federal
rule? First, it has not stopped wire tapping, either by private
individuals or by government agencies. 5 Second, it has not elim-
inated the use of wire tapping in obtaining evidence. In reference
to wire tapping by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it has
been said:
Taking their cue from this top-level lawlessness, the Post
Office Department, the Narcotics Bureau, the Alcohol Tax
Unit, the Internal Revenue Bureau, the Customs Bureau,
and the Department of the Interior have all used wire tap-
ping .... President Truman's telephone was tapped at the
direction of Senator Tobey during the recent Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation hearings .... 46
J. Edgar Hoover has himself admitted that the F.B.I. does tap
wires.47 This official wire tapping is justified by the strained
construction of Section 605 that "divulge" as used in the federal
42. Ibid.
43. 48 STAT. 1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 501 and 48 STAT. 1103 (1934),
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946).
44. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
45. F.B.I-Outside the Law?, 170 NATION 99 (Feb. 1950); Button Your
Lip, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 8, 1949, p. 24. These two articles point out the
widespread use of wire tapping.
46. Westin, Wire Tapping: Supreme Court vs. F.B.I., 174 NATION 172,
173 (Feb. 1952).
47. J. Edgar Hoover, A Comment on the Article "Loyalty Among Gov-
ernment Employees", 58 YALE L.J. 401, 405 (1949).
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statute does not prohibit communication of intercepted messages
from a wire tapper to his superior within one department of the
government.4 8 It is very possible that the F.B.I. would find
another means of justifying wire tapping even if interception
alone were a crime within Section 605.
There are two difficulties blocking effective enforcement of a
restriction on wire tapping. The first applies to tapping by
whomever done. That is the difficulty of detecting a wire tap.
Modern technological development has made interception of tele-
phone calls inexpensive and easy. It can now be done without
physical contact with the telephone wire and without a notice-
able loss of power. 9 With large office buildings and apartments
it is a simple matter for one to gain access to the wire he wants to
tap. For these reasons wire tapping is generally discoverable
only through the mistakes of the tapper or the indiscreet use of
the information so obtained.
The second difficulty applies only to restrictions on government
wire tapping. The problem is that such a restriction works to the
detriment of the police and those whose duty it is to prosecute
criminal cases. In other words, it is to the direct benefit of those
whose duty it is to enforce the restriction not to enforce it. The
rule which excludes evidence obtained by the use of wire tapping
would, at first, seem to solve this problem by removing the incen-
tive to tap. 0 It does not.5 ' Intercepted information can be used
to acquire leads through which independent evidence can be
obtained. Although this evidence is theoretically inadmissible in
court, it is almost impossible for the objecting party to prove
thht a tap occurred.5 2 The prosecution can further protect itself
48. This construction is spelled out but disapproved in Split Hairs and
Tapped Wires, 153 NATION 360 (Oct. 1941).
49. See note 35 supra.50. This was the reason behind the decisions in Nardone v. United States,802 U.S. 379 (1937) and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).51. This should be obvious from the continued extensive use of wire
tapping by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other government de-partments. See Westin, Wire Tapping: Supreme Court -vs. F.B.I., 174
NATION 172 (Feb. 1952).52. This is true because all the wire tap information is in the hands of
the prosecution. The procedure to be followed is set out in Nardone v.United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The one attempting to exclude evidence
as obtained through the use of wire taps must move for its suppressionbefore trial if he is then aware of the fact that a wire tap occurred, and
he must sustain the burden of showing that a tap occurred. If a wire tapis shown, a hearing will be granted to determine what part of the prose-
cution's evidence was thereby obtained. There must be, however, a fairly
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by claiming that the original leads were obtained from confiden-
tial informers, the divulgence of whose names is protected by
privilege. 53 Thus the federal prohibition has not been effective to
the extent of eliminating wire tapping. It has had some restric-
tive effect.5
The original Senate bill,55 allowing wire tapping pursuant to
court order is in substance very similar to the New York statu-
tory provision.5 6 There is a marked difference of opinion as to
what the effect of the New York statute has been.57 It has not
eliminated illegal wire tapping. The same difficulties which arise
in the enforcement of an absolute prohibition arise likewise in the
enforcement of the restrictive provisions of a limited wire tap-
ping statute. Not only has illegal wire tapping been conducted by
private individuals, but the police have failed to comply with the
statutory requirements and, even when the legal procedure has
been followed, the police have misused the information so ac-
quired. 5s The procedure has been used primarily for the detection
of minor crimes and misdemeanors, rather than for the detection
of major criminals, for which purpose it was intended. Warrants
issue for periods up to six months in length and there is no report
kept of the intercepted information except what is reported by
the tapper to his superiors. The use of tapping for minor crimes
and the failure to install an adequate check on the tappers led to
blackmail and extortion under the guise of a legalized police pro-
cedure.59 As to the value of wire tapping in the detection of crime
in New York, there have been both adverse and favorable com-
conclusive showing that a tap occurred before a hearing will be granted.
United States v. Flynn, 103 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States
v. Frankfield, 100 F. Supp. 934 (D. Md. 1951). Once a hearing has been
granted, the prosecution has the burden of showing that a substantial part
of its case was not obtained through the use of wire tapping.
53. See United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945) for
an example of this privilege.
54. It has at least eliminated the use of wire tapping directly as evidence
in federal courts.
55. Mo. Senate Bill No. 198, 67th Gen. Assembly (Feb. 11, 1953).
56. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a.
57. Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative
Problem, 52 COL. L. REv. 165, 196 (1952) (condemning the New York sys-
tem); Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 73 (1947)
(presenting a clear analysis of the New York situation).
58. Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative
Problem, 52 CoL. L. REv. 165 (1952).
59. Ibid.
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ments.60 Assuming that wire tapping has been helpful to the
police, it is questionable whether the advantages have outweighed
the abuses.
Thus it appears from a practical standpoint that neither the
federal nor New York type of statute has been entirely satisfac-
tory in its application. It has been argued that an absolute pro-
hibition is unenforceable, while a limited restriction can be.
enforced. It has been argued that a limited restriction will be
abused and, therefore, an absolute prohibition is necessary.01
These argumeents, like others, ignore the basic problems which
apply to both statutes: the difficulty of discovering wire taps and
the difficulty of enforcement against the police.
On final analysis it would seem that an absolute prohibition of
wire tapping is the more practical method of eliminating the
abuses which permeate the field. First, there would be less oppor-
tunity for the police abuse which developed in New York, unless
the police would tap extensively in violation of the law. If they
did, it would be easier for the public to discover such an open
abuse than it would be to discover abuses in the operation of a
legalized system. Public pressure does have an effect on police
action. Second, since the police themselves would be prohibited
from tapping, they might be more prone to enforce sanctions on
private individuals who attempted to do for their own benefit
what the police could not do. Third, it is highly improbable that
the disadvantages to crime detection would outweigh the advan-
tages to be gained from the decreased opportunity for abuses to
develop in the law enforcement departments.2
The final problem for consideration is the advantage or disad-
vantage of the exclusionary evidence rule. The pending Missouri
statute expressly declares that evidence obtained by wire
tapping is to be inadmissible in court.6 3 The common law
rule is that illegality in obtaining evidence has no effect
on its admissibility in court. 4 Wigmore, in support of the
60. Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 73, 90(1947), footnote 234, illustrates the conflict in opinion citing Thomas E.
Dewey and J. Edgar Hoover on opposite sides of the question.
61. Both of these arguments are set out in Westin, The Wire-Tapping
Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Problem, 52 COL, L. Rav. 165
(1952).
62. See text supported by note 59 supra.
63. Mo. Senate Bill No. 393, 67th Gen. Assembly (1953) as amended by
House Amendment No. 1.
64. 8 WIGMORE, EvEN cE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
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common law rule, expresses the idea that it is ridiculous to hold
that just because one person commits a crime in discovering
another's crime, the second should not be punished.65 Wire tap
evidence, especially when recorded by tape recorder, is extremely
accurate, and it is argued that all possible evidence should be used
to assure conviction of one who is in fact guilty of crime. The
proponents of the common law rule maintain that direct enforce-
ment of restrictions on wire tapping is sufficient to prevent it.6 6
The exclusionary evidence rule is based on the theory that to
eliminate wire tapping, the incentive must be removed. 67 As has
been previously asserted, the exclusion of wire tap evidence in
the federal courts has not been entirely effective in eliminat-
ing the incentive.68 The reason for this is the extreme practical
difficulty of showing that a tap occurred.-9 The application, how-
ever, of the exclusionary evidence rule has had some effect.70 In
light of the difficulty of direct enforcement of prohibitive pro-
visions, it is submitted that the value of the exclusionary evidence
rule as an enforcement method overbalances the disadvantage
which might accrue from the acquittal of a few guilty criminals.
In conclusion it is submitted that the absolute prohibition of
wire tapping is the better solution to the wire tap problem in
conformity with sound policy and with due regard for practical
applicability. The pending Missouri statute forbidding tapping
completely would further resolve any possible conflict between
state and federal law. It is more in harmony with the ideas here
expressed than was the original Senate bill. In light of all factors
and in consideration of probable consequences, it is submitted
that in this writer's opinion the Missouri Legislature acted in the
better interests of the state by the passage of this bill.
ROBERT 0. HIETLAGE.
65. Id. § 2184.
66. Ibid.
67. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
68. See note 52 supra.
69. Since the one attempting to exclude evidence must sustain the burden
of showing that a wire tap occurred, and since this is a difficult burden to
sustain, much evidence is obtained through the indirect use of wire tapping.
Since, as a practical matter, much of this evidence will be admitted in court,
the law enforcement agencies still have a very real reason for wire tapping.
See note 53 supra.
70. See note 54 supra.
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